God
and His Messiah Jesus Christ our Lord - our right and duty to witness
to Him: Gulf War I
Ahmed Chalabi.[Source: Tim Sloan / Agence
France-Presse]On October 30, 1944, Ahmed Chalabi is born into a wealthy,
oligarchic Shiite family with close ties to Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] Chalabi’s mother runs political
salons catering to Iraq’s elite and his father loans money to members of
the ruling family who reward him with top posts in the government,
which he uses to advance his business interests. His grandfather was
also close to the monarchy, holding nine cabinet positions in government
during his lifetime. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] But it was Chalabi’s great
grandfather who, as the tax farmer of Kadimiah, a town near Baghdad,
established the family’s grand fortunes. According to Iraqi historian
Hanna Batatu, Ahmed’s great grandfather was “a very harsh man, [who]
kept a bodyguard of armed slaves and had a special prison at his
disposal” where, according to a friend of Chalabi’s, he imprisoned serfs
who failed to pay their taxes or produce wheat. “When he died the
people of Kadimiah heaved a sigh of relief,” Batatu writes.[BATATU, 2004; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] In 1958, Chalabi’s family will flee
Iraq when the Iraqi Communist Party overthrows the monarchy. Decades
later, Imad Khadduri, a schoolmate of Chalabi’s, will say: “Ahmed wanted
to avenge his father’s ouster and the deprivation of his lands.… Now
he’s trying to fit in his father’s shoes.”[UNGER, 2007, PP. 123]
Shatt al-Arab
waterway. [Source:
CNN]Iraq
invades Iran, officially beginning a nine-year war between those two
countries, though Iraq insists that Iran has been launching artillery
attacks against Iraqi targets since September 4. The overarching reason,
according to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, is over control of the
Shatt al-Arab, the geographically critical waterway between Iran and
Iraq that empties into the Persian Gulf. (Iraq signed over partial
control of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in 1975, but reclaimed the waterway
in 1979 after the fall of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi; Iraq also has hopes
to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan.) The United
States will provide covert military support to both Iran (see November 3, 1986) and Iraq (see1981-1988) during the war. [INFOPLEASE, 2007]
Osirak
nuclear facility. [Source:
GlobalSecurity.org]
(click image to enlarge)On the order of Prime Minister
Menachem Begin and after heated debate among Israeli leaders, Israeli
warplanes strike the Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) Tammuz I nuclear plant
at al-Tuwaitha near Baghdad, destroying it and dealing a severe setback
to Iraq’s nuclear program. Israel claims it fears Iraq is building a
nuclear weapon with which to strike it. Osirak is a French-made nuclear
reactor, which is near completion but lacks any nuclear fuel, thereby
raising no danger of any radioactive link. Ariel Sharon, concurrently
Defense Minister and a proponent of the strike, later says, “This was
perhaps the most difficult decision which faced any [Israeli] government
during all the years of the state’s existence.” The Israeli government
states after the strike, “The atomic bombs which that reactor was
capable of producing, whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium,
would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of
Israel progressively arose.… Under no circumstances will we allow an
enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.” The
reactor is slated to be completed by September, 1981, though it would be
years before it could produce any nuclear-grade fissionable material.
Iraq denies the reactor is developed to produce nuclear weapons, though
the construction of the plant gives credence to claims that Iraq is more
interested in building a weapon than generating electricity. (After the
strike, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says, “Any state in the world
which really wants peace… should help the Arabs in one way or another to
acquire atomic bombs,” giving further credence to suspicions that
Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon.) The Israeli strike follows up
a September 1980 raid on the Osirak facility by Iranian warplanes (see September 30, 1980). Publicly, Iran and Israel are dire
enemies, but Israel has begun secretly selling US-made arms to Iran as a
way to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq (see 1981). [BBC, 7/7/1981; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
5/1995] In 1984, Brookings Institute fellow
Lucien Vandenbroucke will write, “Ironically, Israel’s raid may prove to
be a brilliant tactical success achieved at the expense of the
country’s long-term interests. Certainly, the attack set Iraq’s nuclear
program back several years. But the strike also ushered in a de facto
Israeli claim to nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, a move that in the
long run generally promises to encourage the larger Arab world on the
nuclear path.… In the decision-making process, Israeli fears and the
propensity to rely on worst-case analyses seem to have prevailed. The
advocates of the strike focused on the unreasonable, rather than the
reasonable, aspects of Iraqi behavior, and thus even a limited prospect
that Iraq might soon acquire a nuclear bomb became more of a risk than
they were prepared to accept.” [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/1984]
Ronald Reagan
(left) and William Casey (right).[Source: CIA]President Reagan orders the Defense
Department and the CIA to supply Iraq’s military with intelligence
information, advice, and hardware for battle after being advised to do
so by CIA Director William Casey. Former Reagan national security
official Howard Teicher will later reveal that Casey “personally
spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military
weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war.” The
US will continue to provide this type of intelligence to Iraq until
1988. [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 
; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/24/1995; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002]
Caspar
Weinberger.[Source: US
Department of Defense]Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a
vehement opponent of the US’s arms sales to Iran (see 1981 and December 20, 1983), concludes that if Iraq doesn’t
receive military aid, it will lose its war with Iran (see September 1980). Weinberger arranges the secret swap
of a Soviet T-72 tank given to the Iraqi military in return for four US
howitzers. Some Pentagon intelligence officials covet the Soviet tank
for the information they can glean about Soviet weaponry, but, according
to two highly placed officials in the Reagan administration, Weinberger
sees the deal as an opportunity to begin direct US arms shipments to
Iraq. A Pentagon official explains in 1992, “Cap’s view was that once
the first arms shipments to Iraq were authorized by the President, the
first bite of the forbidden apple had been taken, and other direct
covert arms sales to Iraq would follow.” However, the exchange falls
through when the Iraqis, fearful that the Soviet Union will terminate
its own military aid program, withdraws from the deal. A subsequent
Iraqi offer to exchange a Soviet HIND helicopter also falls through when
the Pentagon expresses its concerns over the criminal record of the
middleman, a Lebanese-born international arms trafficker. However,
Reagan and Defense Department officials continue to find ways to
secretly supply arms to Iraq (see October 1983). Later, Weinberger will call the
Iranian arms deals “insanity. How could you send arms to the Ayatollah
when he was sworn to destroy us?” But Weinberger will be much less
forthcoming about the US’s arms sales to Iraq, summed up under the
sobriquet of “Iraqgate.” Weinberger will later claim that he is not
involved in any arms deals with Iraq, and will say, “The little that I
know was that it was all handled by the CIA. There might have been a
role by some people in the Pentagon. But I didn’t keep a hand in that.”
He will refuse to acknowledge the accuracy of Pentagon memos from 1982
and 1983 sent directly to him that outline proposals to arm Iraq. In a
1992 news article, reporters Murray Waas and Craig Unger note that
Weinberger will repeatedly lie “without compunction” about his
involvement in arms sales to Iraq over the coming years, and observe,
“Whenever his credibility is questioned, Weinberger routinely invokes
concerns for national security and hides behind a veil of secrecy.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Rumsfeld greets
Hussein. [Source:
Washington Note.com]US Special Envoy Donald
Rumsfeld—formerly the Secretary of Defense and now the CEO of the
pharmaceutical company, GD Searle and Co.—personally meets with Saddam
Hussein for 90 minutes in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations
with Iraq. Rumsfeld also discusses US interest in the construction of
the Iraq-Jordan Aqaba oil pipeline [to be built by Bechtel (see December 2, 1983)]. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/10/1983 ; IRAQI TELEVISION, 12/20/1983; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/23/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002;VALLETTE, 3/24/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/14/2003] Rumsfeld does not raise the issue of
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons with Saddam. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]Rumsfeld also delivers a letter to
Hussein from Reagan administration officials declaring that for Iraq to
be defeated by Iran (see September 1980) would be “contrary to United States
interests.” Rumsfeld’s visit represents one side of the somewhat
double-edged US foreign policy in the region: the US has allowed Israel
to sell US-made arms to Iran for use against Iraq (see 1981). By this time, the US has already
started clandestinely providing arms to Iraq as well (see October 1983).[NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992] After his meeting with the Iraqi
president, Rumsfeld meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. They
agree that “the US and Iraq… [share] many common interests.” Rumsfeld
briefly mentions US concerns about Iraq’s chemical weapons, explaining
that US “efforts to assist [Iraq]… [are] inhibited by certain things
that made it difficult for us….” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]On September 19, 2002, almost two
decades later, Rumsfeld will be questioned in Congress about this visit
(see September 19, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002]
Tariq Aziz. [Source: BBC]Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Murphy, the author of a secret policy memo detailing the
administration’s new and covert military support for Iraq (see January 14, 1984), meets with Iraq’s Foreign Minister,
Tariq Aziz, in Baghdad. Murphy later describes Aziz as wearing
olive-green fatigues, clenching a Cuban cigar between his teeth, and
sporting a pearl-handled revolver. Aziz welcomes the covert arms
supplies from the US, and is particularly interested in the proposed
construction of an oil pipeline to run from Iraq to Jordan, very near
the Israeli border. However, mindful of the recent destruction of Iraq’s
nuclear facility at Osirak by the Israelis (see June 7, 1981), Aziz insists that the US help
finance the pipeline, both with government funds and private
participation. Murphy agrees that the project is invaluable both in a
geopolitical and an economic sense, and says he will so inform his
Washington superiors. Murphy gingerly raises the question of Iraq’s use
of chemical weapons against Iranian troops (see 1982), but Aziz denies any such usages.
Murphy doesn’t press the issue, but says that Iraq must, according to
Murphy, “eliminate doubts in the international community by making their
positions and explanations as clear and understandable to the
international public as the allegations have been.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
George Shultz.[Source: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology]US Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger meets with Iraqi
diplomat Ismet Kattani to minimize the damage that the State
Department’s March 5 condemnation (see March 5, 1984) of Iraqi chemical warfare has caused
to US-Iraqi relations. Secretary of State George Shultz is also present
and later sends a cable to embassies in the Middle East with a summary
of the meeting. “Eagleburger began the discussion by taking Kittani
aside to emphasize the central message he wanted him to take back: our
policy of firm opposition to the prohibited use of CW [chemical weapons]
wherever it occurs necessitated our March 5 statement condemning Iraq’s
use of CW,” the note explains. “The statement was not intended to
provide fuel for Khomeini’s propaganda war, nor to imply a shift in US
policy toward Iran and Iraq. The US will continue its efforts to help
prevent an Iranian victory, and earnestly wishes to continue the
progress in its relations with Iraq. The Secretary [Shultz] then entered
and reiterated these points.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/1984 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/23/2003]
Map
showing the strike radii of various Iraqi ballistic missiles.[Source: CIA] (click image to enlarge)US intelligence learns that Iraq’s
Saad 16 research center is attempting to develop ballistic missiles.
This information is relayed by the Defense Department’s Undersecretary
for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, to the Commerce Department’s
(CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration. In spite of this, the
Commerce Department will subsequently approve more than $1 million in
computer sales to the Iraqi research center over the next four years. In
1991, the House Committee on Government Operations will report that 40
percent of the equipment at the Saad 16 research center had come from
the US. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Kurds gassed in
Halabja. [Source:
PersianEye / Corbis]Days after the end of the Iran-Iraq
War (see August 20, 1988), Saddam Hussein begins the first of a
series of poison-gas attacks on Kurdish villages inside Iraq. A
September 1988 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:
“Those who were very close to the bombs died instantly. Those who did
not die instantly found it difficult to breathe and began to vomit. The
gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of the villagers exposed to it. Many
suffered temporary blindness… . Those who could not run from the
growing smell, mostly the very old and the very young, died.” While the
gas attacks are continuing, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead
circulates a highly classified memo among senior State Department
officials recommending that the US cultivate even closer ties with Iraq,
whom it supported over Iran in the last few years of the war (see Early October-November, 1986). Whitehead offers a Cold War
rationale: “[Soviet] clout and influence is on a steady rise as the Gulf
Arabs gain self-confidence and Soviet diplomacy gains in
sophistication. The Soviets have strong cards to play: their border with
Iran and their arms-supply relationship with Iraq. They will continue
to be major players and we should engage them as fully as possible.”
Whitehead adds, “It should be remembered… that we have weathered
Irangate” (see January 17, 1986). More must be done to develop closer
ties with “the ruthless but pragmatic Saddam Hussein.” (Also seeSeptember 8, 1988.) [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
James A. Baker.[Source: Library of Congress]By this date, all international banks
have cut off loans to Iraq. Notwithstanding, President Bush, ignoring
warnings from his own departments about the alarming buildup of the
Iraqi military and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass
destruction (see June 1989 and September 1989), signs the secret National Security
Directive 26 establishing closer ties to the Baghdad regime and
providing $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government.
These funds allow Iraq to continue its development of weapons of mass
destruction. Four days later, Secretary of State James Baker meets with
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and promises that the US will not curb
restrictions on high-technology exports to Iraq. Baker is ignoring the
CIA’s warnings that Iraq is using some of this technology to develop a
nuclear weapon. The State Department’s minutes of the Baker-Aziz meeting
reads in part, “[T]he Secretary admitted that the US does have concerns
about proliferation, but they are worldwide concerns.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/2/1989; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/23/1992; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/10/2002]
Clayton Yeutter.
[Source: Wally
McNamee / Corbis]Secretary of State James Baker calls Agriculture Secretary
Clayton Yeutter and demands that the Agriculture Department authorize a
billion dollars in new loans for Iraq, even though that department, and
others, want to limit or eliminate any funding to Iraq. Baker’s demand
is sparked in part by the refusal of international bankers to loan Iraq
any more money (seeOctober 2-6, 1989). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Alan Simpson. [Source: Britt Bolen]A delegation of US senators meets
with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to deliver a message from President
Bush. The delegation is led by Robert Dole (R-KS) and includes Frank
Murkowski (R-AK), Jim McClure (R-ID), Alan Simpson (R-WY), and Howard
Metzenbaum (D-OH). The senators are joined by US Ambassador to Iraq
April Glaspie, her deputy Joseph Wilson, and various embassy staffers.
Dole delivers the message from Bush: Iraq must abandon its chemical and
biological weapons programs and stockpiles, and, in return, the US will
continue working to improve relations between the two countries (see July 27, 1990 and July 25, 1990). In response, Hussein says he is not
trying to destabilize the region and work against US interests. As part
of his statement, he says: “I didn’t really say I was going to set fire
to half of Israel (see April 1990). What I said was that if Israel
attacks me, thenI will set fire to half of Israel.”
Hussein insists he will only take action against Israel if his country
is attacked first, but such a response will be swift and overwhelming,
with his new WMD playing a central role. He also protests against what
he calls US and British efforts to contain Iraq by scaling back economic
and commercial programs, and what he calls a Western smear campaign
against him and his government. When the other senators are given a
chance to speak to Hussein, Wilson is struck by Metzenbaum’s response.
“Mr. President, I can tell you are a honorable man,” Metzenbaum says.
Wilson later writes, “I remember thinking to myself that whatever
beneficial impact the president’s message and Dole’s statement may have
had on Saddam, it had all just been negated by this obsequious
boot-licking.” Simpson joins Metzenbaum in stroking Hussein, bending
forward so low from his chair that he looks as if he is on bended knee
and telling the dictator: “Mr. President, I can see that what you have
here isn’t really a policy problem; what you have is a public relations
problem. You’ve got a problem with the haughty and pampered press. I
know all about that, because I’ve got problems with the press back home.
What you need is you need a good public relations person.” Wilson will
write: “Saddam no doubt took from the meeting not the admonition to stop
developing weapons of mass destruction and threatening his neighbors,
but rather support for his own misguided belief that he was an honorable
man who didn’t really have policy problems at all, just clumsy
relations. After all, one of Israel’s champions had told him so, and
another American leader had knelt before him to reassure him that he had
no problems with the American government.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 95]
April Glaspie
and Saddam Hussein.[Source:
Wilson's Almanac]The US Ambassador to Iraq, April
Glaspie, goes to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to meet with Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz, to deliver a statement made earlier in the week by
State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler. The statement is
equivocal about Iraq’s belligerent pose towards Kuwait (see July 22, 1990), noting that although the US has no
mutual defense pact with Kuwait, “Iraq and others know there is no place
for coercion and intimidation in the civilized world.” Deputy Chief of
Mission Joseph Wilson will later describe Glaspie as having “a keen mind
and a profound understanding of the issues.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]
One-on-One with Saddam Hussein - Shortly after her meeting with Aziz, she is summoned back to the Foreign Ministry and driven from there to a meeting with Saddam Hussein. Wilson will write: “This was unprecedented. During the two years she had been ambassador, Saddam had never held a private meeting with her, delegating all contact to Aziz or other underlings.” During the meeting, Glaspie promises Hussein that President Bush wants “better and deeper relations.” She tells Hussein that Bush is an “intelligent man,” and adds, “He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002;LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002; WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]
'No Opinion on Arab-Arab Conflicts' - Glaspie tells Hussein: “We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait.… We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your other threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not confrontation—regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?” Hussein answers that he intends to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Kuwait; Glaspie asks what solutions Hussein would find acceptable. Hussein wants to keep the entire Shatt al Arab [a strategically important waterway] under Iraqi control, and if given that, he is willing to make concessions to Kuwait. However, if he has to give up some control of the Shatt, he will renounce all control in favor of bringing Kuwait back under Iraqi dominion. Glaspie replies: “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary [of State James] Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” Reportedly Hussein takes this as a green light from the US to proceed with the invasion. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/1990; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/5/2003]
Glaspie Said to Be Scapegoated - Wilson will later write that the US policy failure that led to the invasion is not Glaspie’s fault and that she is merely made a scapegoat for it (see July 25, 1990 and After): “The one-on-one meeting with Saddam was fateful for Ambassador Glaspie. Out of it emerged the charge that she had not been tough enough with him and had somehow given him a green light to invade Kuwait. Nothing could be further from the truth.”Charge of US Manipulation - Author and investigative producer Barry Lando will say that the price of oil was manipulated with US connivance before the crisis in an effort to hurt Iraq (see Around July 25, 1990).
Barry Lando. [Source: Master Media Speakers]Author and investigative producer
Barry Lando later writes that the entire Iraq-Kuwait dispute may have
been manipulated to some extent by the UUS, with the meeting between US
Ambassador April Glaspie and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (see July 25, 1990) a centerpiece of the operation. In
February 2007, Lando will say, “After Iraq’s war with Iran ended, the
Kuwaitis manipulated the world oil price through their production—they
greatly increased their oil production, which dropped the world oil
price (seeMay 28-30, 1990 and Mid-1990). That really hurt Iraq, because
Saddam was counting on oil revenues to rebuild after the war. He went to
the Kuwaitis and he said, look, back off because you’re killing my
economy. The Kuwaitis refused to back down. Later it came out that the
Kuwaiti’s leaders had been meeting with the CIA exactly to put pressure
on Saddam Hussein. [Glaspie] told Saddam Hussein that we will not take
any position as far as your border disputes with Kuwait go. Her
superior, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, also testified before
Congress a couple of days later (see July 31, 1990). When asked point blank, ‘If Saddam
invades Kuwait, do we have any treaty with Kuwait?’ he said, ‘No, we
don’t.’” [BUZZFLASH (.COM), 2/23/2007]
Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Page 1 of 17 (1632 events)previous | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 | next
In a letter to his law partner,
William H. Herndon, Abraham Lincoln disagrees with Herndon’s argument
for preemptive war. “Allow the president to invade a neighboring nation,
whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion… and you allow
him to make war at pleasure.… The provision of the Constitution giving
the war making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by
the following reasons: kings had always been involving and impoverishing
their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the
good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be
the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so
frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing
this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and
places our President where kings have always stood.” [LINCOLN, 2/15/1848]
British forces invade Iraq and occupy Baghdad, ostensibly to
save the Iraqis from the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In reality,
the occupation is at least partly motivated by the desire to secure the
Iraqi oil fields for Britain. Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude
proclaims: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as
conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. You people of Baghdad are not
to understand that it is the wish of the British government to impose
upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British government
that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their
wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with
their sacred laws.” Author and former CIA agent Larry Kolb will write in
2007: “That sounded a lot to me like the rosy assurances our own
[American] leaders gave the Iraqis in 2003 not long after we flattened
half of Baghdad and then drove our tanks into what was left of it. But
history shows that eventually the British liberators were driven out of
Iraq by pissed-off locals, the insurgency. Just as eventually British
liberators were driven out of Palestine, by both Jews and Arabs. And
just as Napoleon, the liberator of Egypt, had eventually been forced by
the locals to abandon the Nile in humiliation. The track record of
Western armies fighting local insurgencies is abysmal. If President Bush
didn’t know that, surely someone on his staff should have.” [KOLB, 2007, PP. 93-94] Three years later, the British will
find themselves battling a fierce insurgency in central Iraq (see Early 1920).
In a letter to British Foreign
Secretary Arthur Balfour, Sir Maurice Hankey, Britain’s First Secretary
of the War Cabinet, writes, “Oil in the next war will occupy the place
of coal in the present war, or at least a parallel place to coal. The
only big potential supply that we can get under British control is the
Persian [now Iran] and Mesopotamian [now Iraq] supply… Control over
these oil supplies becomes a first class British war aim.” [YERGIN, 1993; MUTTITT, 2005]
Three years after Britain declared
victory in Iraq (see 1917), their occupational forces are
locked in fierce fighting with an Iraqi insurgency that had grown up in
the Iraqi city of Fallujah. The British begin a campaign of aerial
bombing against Fallujah and Baghdad, and heavy urban assaults in
Samarra. [KOLB, 2007, PP. 94]
British generals announce that the insurgency in Iraq (see Early 1920) has been defeated. But former
British Army intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence—“Lawrence of
Arabia”—disagrees, in a dispatch published by the London Times. “The
people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it
will be hard to escape with dignity and honor,” Lawrence writes.
“Things have been far worse than we have told. We are today not far from
a disaster.” Lawrence knows the insurgents—indeed, he had helped train
them in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. [KOLB, 2007, PP. 94]
Ahmed Chalabi.[Source: Tim Sloan / Agence
France-Presse]On October 30, 1944, Ahmed Chalabi is born into a wealthy,
oligarchic Shiite family with close ties to Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] Chalabi’s mother runs political
salons catering to Iraq’s elite and his father loans money to members of
the ruling family who reward him with top posts in the government,
which he uses to advance his business interests. His grandfather was
also close to the monarchy, holding nine cabinet positions in government
during his lifetime. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] But it was Chalabi’s great
grandfather who, as the tax farmer of Kadimiah, a town near Baghdad,
established the family’s grand fortunes. According to Iraqi historian
Hanna Batatu, Ahmed’s great grandfather was “a very harsh man, [who]
kept a bodyguard of armed slaves and had a special prison at his
disposal” where, according to a friend of Chalabi’s, he imprisoned serfs
who failed to pay their taxes or produce wheat. “When he died the
people of Kadimiah heaved a sigh of relief,” Batatu writes.[BATATU, 2004; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] In 1958, Chalabi’s family will flee
Iraq when the Iraqi Communist Party overthrows the monarchy. Decades
later, Imad Khadduri, a schoolmate of Chalabi’s, will say: “Ahmed wanted
to avenge his father’s ouster and the deprivation of his lands.… Now
he’s trying to fit in his father’s shoes.”[UNGER, 2007, PP. 123]
The chief of the State Department’s
Division of Near Eastern Affairs, writes in a memo that the oil
resources of Saudi Arabia are a “stupendous source of strategic power
and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” [CURTIS, 1995, PP. 21;MUTTITT, 2005]
An introductory paper on the Middle
East put out by the British government states that the Middle East is “a
vital prize for any power interested in world influence or domination.”
[CURTIS, 1995, PP. 21; MUTTITT, 2005]
The first “Zippe-type” gas
centrifuge, named after one of its main developers, German scientist
Gernot Zippe, is produced. The centrifuge uses duralumin rotors.
Centrifuge rotors are thin-walled tubes that spin at high speeds
producing enriched uranium 235. Centrifuge rotors are highly sensitive
and must be made from specialized high-strength material. [ALBRIGHT, 10/9/2003]
The use of aluminum for rotors in gas
centrifuges is discontinued. Other materials, such as maraging steel
and carbon fiber, are used instead. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003]
During a news conference, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
answers a question about the idea of an American “preventative war”
against Communism by saying the following: “All of us have heard this
term ‘preventive war’ since the earliest days of Hitler. I recall that
is about the first time I heard it. In this day and time, if we believe
for one second that nuclear fission and fusion, that type of weapon,
would be used in such a war—what is a preventive war? I would say a
preventive war, if the words mean anything, is to wage some sort of
quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm
of destruction later. A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility
today. How could you have one if one of its features would be several
cities lying in ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of
people would be dead and injured and mangled, the transportation systems
destroyed, sanitation implements and systems all gone? That isn’t
preventive war; that is war. I don’t believe there is such a thing; and,
frankly, I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and
talked about such a thing.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/11/1954]
After the 1958 coup that deposes King
Faisal II of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi, 13, and his family flee to Lebanon
because of their close ties to the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (see October 30, 1944). The young Ahmed then goes to
England where he attends boarding school. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile,
studies for his doctorate in math at the University of Chicago where he
gets to know Albert Wohlstetter, a prominent cold-war strategist and a
mentor for Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. After receiving his degree,
Chalabi moves to Lebanon where he works as a math teacher at the
American University of Beirut. His brother, Jawad, is also living in
Beirut and runs Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; SALON, 5/5/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]
The Chalabi family, with some local
partners, found the Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [SALON, 5/5/2004]
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
signs a “Memorandum of Understanding” with Israel obligating the US to
ensure the security of Israel’s oil reserves and energy supply in times
of crisis. “The memorandum… [is] quietly renewed every five years”
according to the London Observer, “with special legislation attached
whereby the US stocks a strategic oil reserve for Israel even if it
entail[s] domestic shortages—at a cost of $3 billion in 2002 to US
taxpayers.” [STATE OF ISRAEL :: MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9/1/1975; JANES FOREIGN REPORT, 4/16/2003; OBSERVER, 4/20/2003] In the event that commercial shippers
refuse to ship oil to Israel, the US is obligated to ship it using its
own tankers. [JANES FOREIGN REPORT, 4/16/2003]
Ahmed Chalabi moves to Jordan where
he founds Petra Bank. His partners include wealthy families from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]
Iraq imports 4,514 kilograms of
natural uranium from Italy. The uranium is used in the Experimental
Research Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication (ERLFF) for research and
development related to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later finds that 191 kilograms
of uranium is unaccounted for. In 1997, it will note, “This amount is
less than the declared accumulation of ‘material unaccounted for’ and
measured discards over the period 1982 to 1990 and may be considered to
be consistent with the nature of the facility operation.” The remainder
is verified and controlled by the IAEA, at the “Location C” storage
facility near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
1997]
Two years after its founding, Petra
Bank, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the second largest bank in Jordan. The
bank’s success is attributed to the Chalabi family’s vast network of
international connections which has enabled Petra to move money in and
out of Jordan several steps ahead of the Jordon’s strict exchange
controls. “They were far more efficient than the other banks,” a
Jordanian businessman tells Salon. Chalabi’s bank lends money to several
influential figures, including Prince Hasan, now a close acquaintance
of Chalabi, to whom the bank lends $30 million. Chalabi’s friendship
with Hassan enables Petra to open a chain of branches in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004] During this period, Petra bank even
does business with Saddam Hussein, helping the dictator finance Iraqi
trade with Jordan. [SALON, 5/5/2004]
Iraq procures “yellowcake” uranium
from Portugal, Niger, and Brazil. Since neither Niger nor Brazil are
members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are not required to submit
the transaction to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Portugal, a signatory to the treaty, informs the IAEA of the transfers.
Iraq also notifies the IAEA of the transfer in August 1981 and again in
July 1982. The total amount of yellowcake uranium secured by Iraq is
563,290 kilograms. The IAEA verifies the amount transferred to Iraq;
including the loss of about 40 kilograms from a drum damaged during
Iraq’s salvaging and concealment attempts in 1991. Like other uranium
transferred to Iraq (see 1979 and 1982), this uranium is verified and
accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)
inspectors, and is kept at “Location C,” a storage complex near the
Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. Later inspections
show that Iraq has not been fully honest about its uranium purchases; it
is not until July 1991 that Iraq declares the full amount of uranium it
has received. Furthermore, later inspections will show that
“considerable” amounts of uranium cannot be accounted for. By July 1994,
IAEA inspectors will verify the complete amounts and dispositions of
Iraq’s yellowcake. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
1997]
At this time, an engineer by the name
of Joe Turner is working in the gas centrifuge program at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. His work pertains not to actual centrifuges, but to
the platforms upon which the centrifuges are installed.[WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003; WORLDNETDAILY, 8/12/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE, US
ADMINISTRATION, AND/OR UN INSPECTORS]
Joe T., an engineer, begins working
for the CIA. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003 SOURCES:UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE, US
ADMINISTRATION, AND/OR UN INSPECTORS]
Shatt al-Arab
waterway. [Source:
CNN]Iraq
invades Iran, officially beginning a nine-year war between those two
countries, though Iraq insists that Iran has been launching artillery
attacks against Iraqi targets since September 4. The overarching reason,
according to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, is over control of the
Shatt al-Arab, the geographically critical waterway between Iran and
Iraq that empties into the Persian Gulf. (Iraq signed over partial
control of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in 1975, but reclaimed the waterway
in 1979 after the fall of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi; Iraq also has hopes
to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan.) The United
States will provide covert military support to both Iran (see November 3, 1986) and Iraq (see1981-1988) during the war. [INFOPLEASE, 2007]
Iraq begins developing “Zippe-type”
centrifuges (see 1950s). The centrifuges use rotors made
from maraging steel and carbon fiber, which are more advanced than
aluminum and allow the rotor to spin at significantly higher speeds. But
Iraq has problems building centrifuges—even with considerable
assistance from German experts. [ALBRIGHT, 10/9/2003]
The Reagan administration provides
covert support to Iraq in an effort to prevent Iran from overrunning the
oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002; NATION, 8/26/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
US Air Force officers are secretly deployed to Iraq to assist
their counterparts in the Iraqi military. [NATION, 8/26/2002]
The US provides satellite photography to Iraq revealing the
movements of the Iranian forces. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002 SOURCES: SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS WITH DIRECT
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROGRAM, UNNAMED INFORMED SOURCES INTERVIEWED BY
REPORTER BOB WOODWARD]
The US provides Iraq with intelligence gathered by
Saudi-owned AWACS operated by the Pentagon. [NATION, 8/26/2002]
Iraq uses US-supplied military intelligence “to calibrate
attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops….” (see 1984) [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986]
“[M]ore than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency….
secretly [provide] detailed information on Iranian deployments,
tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage
assessments for Iraq.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002]
President Reagan and Vice President George Bush personally
deliver military advice to Saddam Hussein, both directly and through
intermediaries (see 1986).[AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
The US closely monitors “third country arms sales to Iraq to
make sure Iraq [has] the military weaponry required.” [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
According to the censured portion of Iraq’s December 7, 2002
declaration to the UN (see December 7, 2002) (see December 19, 2002), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories help train Iraqi nuclear
weapons scientists and provide nonfissile material for Iraq’s nuclear
weapons program. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]
US Air Force officers are secretly deployed to Iraq to assist
their counterparts in the Iraqi military. [NATION, 8/26/2002] The US provides satellite photography to Iraq revealing the
movements of the Iranian forces. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002 SOURCES: SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS WITH DIRECT
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROGRAM, UNNAMED INFORMED SOURCES INTERVIEWED BY
REPORTER BOB WOODWARD] The US provides Iraq with intelligence gathered by
Saudi-owned AWACS operated by the Pentagon. [NATION, 8/26/2002] Iraq uses US-supplied military intelligence “to calibrate
attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops….” (see 1984) [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986] “[M]ore than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency….
secretly [provide] detailed information on Iranian deployments,
tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage
assessments for Iraq.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002] President Reagan and Vice President George Bush personally
deliver military advice to Saddam Hussein, both directly and through
intermediaries (see 1986).[AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] The US closely monitors “third country arms sales to Iraq to
make sure Iraq [has] the military weaponry required.” [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] According to the censured portion of Iraq’s December 7, 2002
declaration to the UN (see December 7, 2002) (see December 19, 2002), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories help train Iraqi nuclear
weapons scientists and provide nonfissile material for Iraq’s nuclear
weapons program. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]
US and British companies are among
several Western firms that sell Iraq materials that can be used to
develop nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/21/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
United States - Biological: American Type Culture Collection, several
biological precursor agents for diseases like anthrax, gangrene, and the
West Nile virus; Alcolac International, Thiodiglycol, the mustard gas
precursor; Al Haddad, 60 tons of a chemical that could be used to make
sarin; Dow Chemical, $1.5 million of pesticides (seeDecember 1988). [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2002;WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
Nuclear: TI Coating; UNISYS; Tektronix; Leybold Vacuum
Systems; Finnigan-MAT-US; Hewlett Packard; Dupont; Consarc; Cerberus
(LTD) ; Canberra Industries; Axel Electronics Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002]
Rocket Program: Honeywell ;TI Coating; UNISYS; Honeywell;
Semetex; Sperry Corp.; Tektronix; Hewlett Packard; Eastman Kodak;
Electronic Associates; EZ Logic Data Systems, Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002]
Conventional weapons: Honeywell; Spektra Physics; TI Coating;
UNISYS; Sperry Corp.; Rockwell; Hewlett Packard; Carl Zeis -U.S; Union
Carbide. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]
United Kingdom - : Nuclear weapons: Euromac Ltd-UK.; C Plath-Nuclear; Endshire
Export Marketing; International Computer Systems; MEED International;
International Computer Limited; Matrix Churchill Corp.; Ali Ashour
Daghir.; Inwako; XYY Options, Inc. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
Chemical weapons: MEED International; International Computer
Systems; International Military Services; Sheffield Forgemasters;
Technology Development Group; International Signal and Control; Terex
Corporation; Walter Somers Ltd.[SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
Conventional: International Computer Systems; International
Computer Limited; TMG Engineering. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
United States -
Biological: American Type Culture Collection, several
biological precursor agents for diseases like anthrax, gangrene, and the
West Nile virus; Alcolac International, Thiodiglycol, the mustard gas
precursor; Al Haddad, 60 tons of a chemical that could be used to make
sarin; Dow Chemical, $1.5 million of pesticides (seeDecember 1988). [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2002;WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] Nuclear: TI Coating; UNISYS; Tektronix; Leybold Vacuum
Systems; Finnigan-MAT-US; Hewlett Packard; Dupont; Consarc; Cerberus
(LTD) ; Canberra Industries; Axel Electronics Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002] Rocket Program: Honeywell ;TI Coating; UNISYS; Honeywell;
Semetex; Sperry Corp.; Tektronix; Hewlett Packard; Eastman Kodak;
Electronic Associates; EZ Logic Data Systems, Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002] Conventional weapons: Honeywell; Spektra Physics; TI Coating;
UNISYS; Sperry Corp.; Rockwell; Hewlett Packard; Carl Zeis -U.S; Union
Carbide. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]United Kingdom -
: Nuclear weapons: Euromac Ltd-UK.; C Plath-Nuclear; Endshire
Export Marketing; International Computer Systems; MEED International;
International Computer Limited; Matrix Churchill Corp.; Ali Ashour
Daghir.; Inwako; XYY Options, Inc. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003] Chemical weapons: MEED International; International Computer
Systems; International Military Services; Sheffield Forgemasters;
Technology Development Group; International Signal and Control; Terex
Corporation; Walter Somers Ltd.[SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003] Conventional: International Computer Systems; International
Computer Limited; TMG Engineering. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
Entity Tags: Rockwell, Matrix Churchill Corp., MEED International, Technology Development Group, Inwako, Leybold Vacuum Systems, Semetex, International Signal and Control, Sheffield Forgemasters, Tektronix, Sperry Corp., XYY Options, Inc.,Walter Somers Ltd., Union Carbide, UNISYS, Terex Corporation, Spektra Physics, TMG Engineering, International Military Services, International Computer Systems, TI Coating, Honeywell, Carl Zeis -U.S, Canberra Industries, C Plath-Nuclear, Axel Electronics Inc., American Type Culture Collection, Al Haddad, Alcolac International,Ali Ashour Daghir, Cerberus (LTD), International Computer Limited, Dow Chemical,Euromac Ltd-UK, Finnigan-MAT-US, Hewlett Packard, Consarc, Endshire Export Marketing, Eastman Kodak, Electronic Associates, Dupont, EZ Logic Data Systems, Inc.
Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin
calls televangelist and nascent political ally Jerry Falwell (see 1980) and says: “Tomorrow you’re going to
read some strange things about what we’re going to do. But our safety is
at stake. I wanted you, my good friend, to know what we are going to
do.” Israel is preparing to use US-provided F-16s to destroy Iraq’s
Osirak nuclear reactor (see June 7, 1981). Begin is concerned that the US will
object to Israel’s use of the aircraft for non-defensive purposes.
Falwell tells Begin, “I want to congratulate you for a mission that
[makes] us very proud that we manufactured those F-16s.” Many Reagan
officials are not happy that Israel violated the agreement with the US
over use of the warplanes, but even though Vice President Bush and Chief
of Staff James Baker both believe that Israel should be punished, Begin
has provided himself cover on the Christian right. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 109-110]
)
Osirak
nuclear facility. [Source:
GlobalSecurity.org]
(click image to enlarge)On the order of Prime Minister
Menachem Begin and after heated debate among Israeli leaders, Israeli
warplanes strike the Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) Tammuz I nuclear plant
at al-Tuwaitha near Baghdad, destroying it and dealing a severe setback
to Iraq’s nuclear program. Israel claims it fears Iraq is building a
nuclear weapon with which to strike it. Osirak is a French-made nuclear
reactor, which is near completion but lacks any nuclear fuel, thereby
raising no danger of any radioactive link. Ariel Sharon, concurrently
Defense Minister and a proponent of the strike, later says, “This was
perhaps the most difficult decision which faced any [Israeli] government
during all the years of the state’s existence.” The Israeli government
states after the strike, “The atomic bombs which that reactor was
capable of producing, whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium,
would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of
Israel progressively arose.… Under no circumstances will we allow an
enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.” The
reactor is slated to be completed by September, 1981, though it would be
years before it could produce any nuclear-grade fissionable material.
Iraq denies the reactor is developed to produce nuclear weapons, though
the construction of the plant gives credence to claims that Iraq is more
interested in building a weapon than generating electricity. (After the
strike, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says, “Any state in the world
which really wants peace… should help the Arabs in one way or another to
acquire atomic bombs,” giving further credence to suspicions that
Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon.) The Israeli strike follows up
a September 1980 raid on the Osirak facility by Iranian warplanes (see September 30, 1980). Publicly, Iran and Israel are dire
enemies, but Israel has begun secretly selling US-made arms to Iran as a
way to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq (see 1981). [BBC, 7/7/1981; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
5/1995] In 1984, Brookings Institute fellow
Lucien Vandenbroucke will write, “Ironically, Israel’s raid may prove to
be a brilliant tactical success achieved at the expense of the
country’s long-term interests. Certainly, the attack set Iraq’s nuclear
program back several years. But the strike also ushered in a de facto
Israeli claim to nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, a move that in the
long run generally promises to encourage the larger Arab world on the
nuclear path.… In the decision-making process, Israeli fears and the
propensity to rely on worst-case analyses seem to have prevailed. The
advocates of the strike focused on the unreasonable, rather than the
reasonable, aspects of Iraqi behavior, and thus even a limited prospect
that Iraq might soon acquire a nuclear bomb became more of a risk than
they were prepared to accept.” [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/1984]
Iraq imports 1,767 kilograms of
enriched uranium from Italy, and 6,005 kilograms of depleted uranium
from Italy as well. As with its earlier uranium import from Italy (see 1979), this uranium is verified and
accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA)
inspectors, and is kept at “Location C,” a storage complex near the
Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
1997]
Ronald Reagan
(left) and William Casey (right).[Source: CIA]President Reagan orders the Defense
Department and the CIA to supply Iraq’s military with intelligence
information, advice, and hardware for battle after being advised to do
so by CIA Director William Casey. Former Reagan national security
official Howard Teicher will later reveal that Casey “personally
spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military
weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war.” The
US will continue to provide this type of intelligence to Iraq until
1988. [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/24/1995; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002]Caspar
Weinberger.[Source: US
Department of Defense]Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a
vehement opponent of the US’s arms sales to Iran (see 1981 and December 20, 1983), concludes that if Iraq doesn’t
receive military aid, it will lose its war with Iran (see September 1980). Weinberger arranges the secret swap
of a Soviet T-72 tank given to the Iraqi military in return for four US
howitzers. Some Pentagon intelligence officials covet the Soviet tank
for the information they can glean about Soviet weaponry, but, according
to two highly placed officials in the Reagan administration, Weinberger
sees the deal as an opportunity to begin direct US arms shipments to
Iraq. A Pentagon official explains in 1992, “Cap’s view was that once
the first arms shipments to Iraq were authorized by the President, the
first bite of the forbidden apple had been taken, and other direct
covert arms sales to Iraq would follow.” However, the exchange falls
through when the Iraqis, fearful that the Soviet Union will terminate
its own military aid program, withdraws from the deal. A subsequent
Iraqi offer to exchange a Soviet HIND helicopter also falls through when
the Pentagon expresses its concerns over the criminal record of the
middleman, a Lebanese-born international arms trafficker. However,
Reagan and Defense Department officials continue to find ways to
secretly supply arms to Iraq (see October 1983). Later, Weinberger will call the
Iranian arms deals “insanity. How could you send arms to the Ayatollah
when he was sworn to destroy us?” But Weinberger will be much less
forthcoming about the US’s arms sales to Iraq, summed up under the
sobriquet of “Iraqgate.” Weinberger will later claim that he is not
involved in any arms deals with Iraq, and will say, “The little that I
know was that it was all handled by the CIA. There might have been a
role by some people in the Pentagon. But I didn’t keep a hand in that.”
He will refuse to acknowledge the accuracy of Pentagon memos from 1982
and 1983 sent directly to him that outline proposals to arm Iraq. In a
1992 news article, reporters Murray Waas and Craig Unger note that
Weinberger will repeatedly lie “without compunction” about his
involvement in arms sales to Iraq over the coming years, and observe,
“Whenever his credibility is questioned, Weinberger routinely invokes
concerns for national security and hides behind a veil of secrecy.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Caspar Weinberger, Reagan administration, Murray Waas, Craig Unger
Category
Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
The Reagan administration—despite
stern objections from Congress—removes Iraq from the US State
Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism (see 1979).[NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/1982; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002] This clears the way for future US
military aid to that country. [PHYTHIAN, 1997]
President Reagan issues a national
security directive which formalizes US policy toward the Iraq-Iran war,
committing the US to continued support for Iraq to avoid an Iranian
victory. The document is authored by National Security aides Howard
Teicher and Geoff Kemp. [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS
CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY
PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO
IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002]
; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002]
Secretary
of Commerce Howard Baldridge and Secretary of State George Shultz
successfully lobby the National Security Council (NSC) adviser to
approve the sale of 10 Bell helicopters to Iraq in spite of objections
from other NSC members. It is claimed that the helicopters will be used
for crop spraying. These same helicopters are later used in 1988 to
deploy poison gas against Iranians and possibly Iraqi Kurds (see March 1988). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 37-38]
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt supply Iraq with US
howitzers, helicopters, bombs, and other weapons with the secret
approval of the Reagan administration. [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 35] Italy also funnels arms to Iraq at
the insistence of President Reagan who personally made the request to
Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti. [FRIEDMAN, 1993, PP. 51-54; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 36]
William Eagleton, the chief of the
US-interests section in Baghdad, writes a memo that asserts the US can
secretly supply arms to Iraq for use against Iran through third-party
nations. “We can selectively lift restrictions on third party transfers
of US-licensed military equipment to Iraq,” he writes. Although Eagleton
is not the architect of this policy—that is primarily Defense Secretary
Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Shultz’s
assistant, Richard Murphy, who fear that Iran will lead a rise of
Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region—Eagleton’s memo heralds the
onset of US arms transfers to Iraq through several regional countries,
including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The arms transfers
are almost certainly illegal, a direct violation of the Arms Export
Control Act, which directs the president to inform Congress if any such
third-party arms transfers are enacted. Reagan officials decide not to
inform Congress because they know Congress will never approve the arms
transfers, particularly in light of the US’s stated policy of neutrality
towards the Iran-Iraq War. Congress also knows nothing of the Reagan
administration’s secret supplying of arms to Iran (see 1981). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
US State Department official Jonathan
T. Howe sends Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger a memo
reporting that US intelligence has determined that “Iraq has acquired a
CW [chemical weapons] production capability, primarily from Western
firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary” and that Iraq has
used chemical weapons against Iranian forces and Kurdish insurgents.
Referring to the US policy “of seeking a halt to CW use wherever it
occurs,” Howe says the US is “considering” approaching Iraq directly,
but in a way that avoids playing “into Iran’s hands by fueling its
propaganda against Iraq.” Significantly, the memo acknowledges that the
US has so far limited its “efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close
monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the
sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired
results.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 11/1/1983 ]
]
US President Ronald Reagan issues
National Security Directive 114 on the United States’ policy toward the
Iran-Iraq war. The document—which makes no mention of Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons—calls for increased regional military cooperation to
protect oil facilities and for improving US military capabilities in the
region. The directive states, “Because of the real and psychological
impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the
international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal
promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic.” [US PRESIDENT, 11/26/1983 ]
]Rumsfeld greets
Hussein. [Source:
Washington Note.com]US Special Envoy Donald
Rumsfeld—formerly the Secretary of Defense and now the CEO of the
pharmaceutical company, GD Searle and Co.—personally meets with Saddam
Hussein for 90 minutes in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations
with Iraq. Rumsfeld also discusses US interest in the construction of
the Iraq-Jordan Aqaba oil pipeline [to be built by Bechtel (see December 2, 1983)]. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/10/1983 ; IRAQI TELEVISION, 12/20/1983; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/23/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002;VALLETTE, 3/24/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/14/2003] Rumsfeld does not raise the issue of
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons with Saddam. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]Rumsfeld also delivers a letter to
Hussein from Reagan administration officials declaring that for Iraq to
be defeated by Iran (see September 1980) would be “contrary to United States
interests.” Rumsfeld’s visit represents one side of the somewhat
double-edged US foreign policy in the region: the US has allowed Israel
to sell US-made arms to Iran for use against Iraq (see 1981). By this time, the US has already
started clandestinely providing arms to Iraq as well (see October 1983).[NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992] After his meeting with the Iraqi
president, Rumsfeld meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. They
agree that “the US and Iraq… [share] many common interests.” Rumsfeld
briefly mentions US concerns about Iraq’s chemical weapons, explaining
that US “efforts to assist [Iraq]… [are] inhibited by certain things
that made it difficult for us….” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]On September 19, 2002, almost two
decades later, Rumsfeld will be questioned in Congress about this visit
(see September 19, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002]
The CIA secretly provides Iraqi
intelligence with instructions on how to “calibrate” its mustard gas
attacks on Iranian troops. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986]
Vice-President George H.W. Bush
becomes involved in the Reagan administration’s covert arming of Iraq,
an operation which eventually comes to be known as “Iraqgate.” There is
no evidence to show that Bush knew about the Pentagon’s efforts to arm
Iraq through third parties (see October 1983), but subsequent aspects of the
operation go through the National Security Planning Group, of which Bush
is a member. According to participants in the group’s meetings, Bush is
a strong advocate of the Aqaba pipeline project (see January 14, 1984) and other aspects of the Reagan
administration’s covert tilt towards Iraq. [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Late January 1984: US Official Meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister to Discuss Details of US Arms Deals
Tariq Aziz. [Source: BBC]Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Murphy, the author of a secret policy memo detailing the
administration’s new and covert military support for Iraq (see January 14, 1984), meets with Iraq’s Foreign Minister,
Tariq Aziz, in Baghdad. Murphy later describes Aziz as wearing
olive-green fatigues, clenching a Cuban cigar between his teeth, and
sporting a pearl-handled revolver. Aziz welcomes the covert arms
supplies from the US, and is particularly interested in the proposed
construction of an oil pipeline to run from Iraq to Jordan, very near
the Israeli border. However, mindful of the recent destruction of Iraq’s
nuclear facility at Osirak by the Israelis (see June 7, 1981), Aziz insists that the US help
finance the pipeline, both with government funds and private
participation. Murphy agrees that the project is invaluable both in a
geopolitical and an economic sense, and says he will so inform his
Washington superiors. Murphy gingerly raises the question of Iraq’s use
of chemical weapons against Iranian troops (see 1982), but Aziz denies any such usages.
Murphy doesn’t press the issue, but says that Iraq must, according to
Murphy, “eliminate doubts in the international community by making their
positions and explanations as clear and understandable to the
international public as the allegations have been.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]George Shultz.[Source: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology]US Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger meets with Iraqi
diplomat Ismet Kattani to minimize the damage that the State
Department’s March 5 condemnation (see March 5, 1984) of Iraqi chemical warfare has caused
to US-Iraqi relations. Secretary of State George Shultz is also present
and later sends a cable to embassies in the Middle East with a summary
of the meeting. “Eagleburger began the discussion by taking Kittani
aside to emphasize the central message he wanted him to take back: our
policy of firm opposition to the prohibited use of CW [chemical weapons]
wherever it occurs necessitated our March 5 statement condemning Iraq’s
use of CW,” the note explains. “The statement was not intended to
provide fuel for Khomeini’s propaganda war, nor to imply a shift in US
policy toward Iran and Iraq. The US will continue its efforts to help
prevent an Iranian victory, and earnestly wishes to continue the
progress in its relations with Iraq. The Secretary [Shultz] then entered
and reiterated these points.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/1984 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/23/2003]
Iran presents a draft resolution to the UN which condemns
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. The US delegate to the UN is instructed
to push for a “no decision” on the resolution, or if not possible, cast
an abstaining vote. Iraq’s ambassador meets with the US ambassador to
the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asks for “restraint” in responding to the
issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. [BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
The US State Department briefs Donald
Rumsfeld, who is preparing to make another visit to Baghdad (see March 26, 1984). In a memo to Rumsfeld, Secretary of
State George Shultz laments that relations with Iraq have soured
because of the State Department’s March 5 condemnation (see March 5, 1984) of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons
and expresses considerable concern over the future of the Aqaba pipeline
project [to be built by Bechtel (see December 2, 1983)] which the US is pushing. Shultz
writes: “Two event have worsened the atmosphere in Baghdad since your
last stop there in December: (1) Iraq has only partly repulsed the
initial thrust of a massive Iranian invasion, losing the strategically
significant Majnun Island oil fields and accepting heavy casualties; (2)
Bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation
of Iraq for CW [chemical weapons] use, despite our repeated warnings
that this issue would emerge [as a public issue] sooner or later. Given
its wartime preoccupations and its distress at our CW statement, the
Iraqi leadership probably will have little interest in discussing
Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other matters except as they may
impinge on Iraq’s increasingly desperate struggle for survival. If
Saddam or Tariq Aziz receives you against consider, and to reject, a
pending application from Westinghouse to participate in a $160 million
portion of a $1 billion Hyundai thermal power plant project in Iraq,
this decision will only confirm Iraqi perceptions that ExIm
[Export-Import Bank] financing for the Aqaba pipeline is out of the
question. Eagleburger tried to put this perception to a rest, however,
emphasizing to Kittani the administration’s firm support for the line
(see March 15, 1984). The door is not yet closed to ExIm
or other USG [US government] financial assistance to this project….” At
the very end of the cable, it is noted that “Iraq officials have
professed to be at a loss to explain our actions as measured against our
stated objectives. As with our CW statement, their temptation is to
give up rational analysis and retreat to the line that US policies are
basically anti-Arab and hostage to the desires of Israel.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/24/1984 ; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
During a meeting in Jordan, Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and
US diplomat James Placke discuss a proposed draft resolution that Iran
presented to the UN Security Council (see Mid-March 1984) calling on the international body to
condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Hamdoon tells Placke that Iraq
would prefer a Security Council presidential statement in lieu of a
resolution, adding that the statement should (1) “mention former
resolutions of the war”; (2) include a “strong call for progress toward
ending the war through ceasefire or negotiations”; and (3) not identify
any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke
says that he will honor the request but asks that Iraq halt its
purchasing of chemical weapons from US suppliers so as not to
“embarrass” the US. Placke also warns that the US would be implementing
licensing requirements on five chemical compounds for both Iraq and
Iran. Placke says that the US does not want to be the “source of supply
for anything that could contribute to the production of CW,” but adds
reassuringly that the US does “not want this issue to dominate our
bilateral relationship.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4/6/1984 ; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
During a State Department press
conference, reporters raise the issue of US relations with Iraq and the
latter’s use of chemical weapons. A reporter asks, “Has there been any
export of these chemicals [referring to agents used for the production
of chemical weapons] from the US to Iran or Iraq at all in the past, in
the recent past?” The spokesperson responds, “No, we do not have reason
to believe that exports from the United States have been used by either
Iran or Iraq in this connection.” Later in the press briefing, a
reporter asks, “In light of your finding that Iraq has used nerve gas
and/or other forms of chemical warfare, does this have any effect on US
recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a
broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations?” The
spokesperson answers, “No. I’m not aware of any change in our position.
We’re interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/31/1984 ]
]
US President Ronald Reagan issues
presidential directive NSDD 139, titled, “Measures to improve US posture
and readiness to respond to developments in the Iran-Iraq War.” The
directive stresses the importance of ensuring US access to military
facilities in the Gulf region and preventing “an Iraqi collapse.” Though
the directive says that the US should maintain its policy of
“unambiguous” condemnation of chemical warfare—without mentioning
Iraq—the document also emphasizes that the US should “place equal stress
on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and
inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.” The
directive does not suggest ending or reducing US support for Iraq. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/30/1984 ; BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
; BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
A Department of State memo from the special adviser to the
secretary on nonproliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs titled
“US Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions,” states that the
government is reviewing its policy for “the sale of certain categories
of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities” and the review’s
“preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear
entities.” [DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 5/9/1984 ]
]
A
Defense Intelligence Agency report concludes that Iraq will probably
“continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical
capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/31/1984 ]
]
The Reagan and Bush administrations’ Commerce Departments
allow US companies and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
to export chemical and biological agents as well as other dual-use
items to Iraq, despite the country’s known record of using chemical
weapons. According to government regulations, the Commerce Department
must send applications for export licenses which involve items related
to national security to the appropriate US government agencies for
review. Reviewing agencies include the State Department, Department of
Defense, Energy Department, and Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination.
But in many cases, the Commerce Department either does not send
national security-related applications to these agencies for review, or
if it does, it overrides a review agency’s recommendation not to grant a
license, allowing the item to be exported anyway. [TIMMERMAN, 1991, PP. 202, 410;JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 79] According to two Senate Committee
Reports that will be completed in 1994, one on May 25 and another on
October 7, dual-use chemical and biological agents exported to Iraq from
the US significantly contributed to the country’s weapons arsenal. The
initial May report will say the agents “were not attenuated or weakened
and were capable of reproduction” and the October report will reveal
that the “microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to
those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi
biological warfare program.” The 1994 investigation also determines that
other exports such as plans and equipment also contributed
significantly to Iraq’s military capabilities. “UN inspectors had
identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported
from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department
of Commerce, and established] that these items were used to further
Iraq’s chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery
system development program,” Donald Riegle, the chairman of the
committee, will explain. He also says that between January 1985 and
August 1990, the “executive branch of our government approved 771
different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq.” [US CONGRESS, 5/25/1994; US CONGRESS, 5/25/1994; US CONGRESS, 10/7/1994; COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002]
Biological and chemical agents - Bacillus Anthracis, cause of anthrax. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin. It was
sold to Iraq right up until 1992. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Histoplasma Capsulatam, cause of a disease attacking lungs,
brain, spinal cord and heart. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002]
Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs.
[COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Clotsridium Perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria causing
systemic illness, gas gangrene. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Clostridium tetani, highly toxigenic. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Also, Escherichia Coli (E.Coli); genetic materials; human and
bacterial DNA.[COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002]
VX nerve gas. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Pralidoxine, an antidote to nerve gas which can also be
reverse engineered to create actual nerve gas. This was sold to Iraq in
March 1992, after the end of the Gulf War. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Other exports - Chemical warfare-agent production facility plans and
technical drawings.[NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002]
Chemical warfare filling equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002]
Missile fabrication equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002]
Missile system guidance equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002]
Graphics terminals to design and analyze rockets. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991]
Machine tools and lasers to extend ballistic missile range. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Computers to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
$1 million in computers, flight simulators and other
technology products that went to Saad 16 research center in Iraq (see November 1986). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991]
Biological and chemical agents -
Bacillus Anthracis, cause of anthrax. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin. It was
sold to Iraq right up until 1992. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Histoplasma Capsulatam, cause of a disease attacking lungs,
brain, spinal cord and heart. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002] Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs.
[COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clotsridium Perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria causing
systemic illness, gas gangrene. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clostridium tetani, highly toxigenic. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Also, Escherichia Coli (E.Coli); genetic materials; human and
bacterial DNA.[COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002] VX nerve gas. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Pralidoxine, an antidote to nerve gas which can also be
reverse engineered to create actual nerve gas. This was sold to Iraq in
March 1992, after the end of the Gulf War. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]Other exports -
Chemical warfare-agent production facility plans and
technical drawings.[NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Chemical warfare filling equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Missile fabrication equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Missile system guidance equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Graphics terminals to design and analyze rockets. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991] Machine tools and lasers to extend ballistic missile range. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991] Computers to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991] $1 million in computers, flight simulators and other
technology products that went to Saad 16 research center in Iraq (see November 1986). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991]
The Reagan administration formally
restores diplomatic relations with Iraq. The US had broken off relations
with Iraq in 1967. Administration officials, who are already involved
in secretly supplying military aid to Iraq for use against Iran (seeOctober 1983), ignore allegations that Iraq is
using lethal chemical weapons against Iranian troops, including mustard
gas and fungal poisons. Administration officials will later claim that
no one had any idea that those allegations were true, but according to a
government official, the administration has indeed known of the Iraqis’
use of chemical weapons for over a year by this time. Officials have
privately chided Iraq for its use of such weapons, but Reagan officials
continue to press forward with the administration’s agenda of increased
economic and military cooperation even though the Iraqis ignore the US’s
protests against the use of chemical weapons. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/6/1984; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
Albert Wohlstetter introduces Ahmed
Chalabi to Richard Perle, undersecretary of defense for
international-security policy. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002]
US Secretary of State George Shultz
successfully convinces Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) to drop a House bill
that would have put Iraq back on the State Department’s list of states
that sponsor terrorism. Shultz’s argument is that the United States is
actively engaged in “diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive
issues.” He asserts that “Iraq has effectively distanced itself from
international terrorism” and insists that if the US discovers any
evidence implicating Iraq in the support of terrorist groups, the US
government “would promptly return Iraq to the list.” [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 54]
)
Map
showing the strike radii of various Iraqi ballistic missiles.[Source: CIA] (click image to enlarge)US intelligence learns that Iraq’s
Saad 16 research center is attempting to develop ballistic missiles.
This information is relayed by the Defense Department’s Undersecretary
for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, to the Commerce Department’s
(CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration. In spite of this, the
Commerce Department will subsequently approve more than $1 million in
computer sales to the Iraqi research center over the next four years. In
1991, the House Committee on Government Operations will report that 40
percent of the equipment at the Saad 16 research center had come from
the US. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]Late November 1986: Iran-Contra Scandal Will Not Affect US-Iraq Intelligence Link, Says CIA Director
Shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal
is first revealed in the press, CIA Director William J. Casey meets with
Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, a second time
(see October 1986) and assures him that the new
Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) will remain open.[WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986]
Neoconservative
academics and authors Laurie Mylroie and Daniel Pipes write an article
for the New Republic entitled “Back Iraq: Time for a US Tilt in the
Mideast.” Mylroie and Pipes argue that the US must publicly embrace
Saddam Hussein’s secular dictatorship as a bulwark against the Islamic
fundamentalism of Iran. Backing Iraq “could lay the basis for a fruitful
relationship” that would benefit US and Israeli interests, they write.
They believe Washington should move to a closer relationship with
Hussein because Iraq holds a more moderate view of Israel and the US
than other countries in the Middle East. “The American weapons that Iraq
could make good use of include remotely scatterable and anti-personnel
mines and counterartillery radar.” Mylroie and Pipes argue not just for
weapons sales to Iraq, but for the US to share intelligence with that
nation: “The United States might also consider upgrading intelligence it
is supplying Baghdad.” Mylroie and Pipes are apparently uninterested in
the stories of Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against both Iranians
and his own citizens (see March 5, 1984,March 1988, and August 25, 1988). After the 9/11 attacks, Mylroie
will change her opinion and join the call for Hussein’s overthrow,
blaming him for a raft of terror attacks going back to the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing (see 1990, October 2000, and September 12, 2001). [NEW REPUBLIC, 4/27/1987 ; COUNTERPUNCH, 8/13/2003;ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 68]
; COUNTERPUNCH, 8/13/2003;ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 68]
One batch each of salmonella and E
coli is sent to the Iraqi State Company for Drug Industries with the
approval of the US Department of Commerce. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
The US increases the amount of
military intelligence it provides Iraq, a significant portion of which
is channeled to the Iraqis through the CIA’s Baghdad office.[WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
The US provides Baghdad with $500
million in credits to buy American farm products. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/10/2002]
The
US Commerce Department allows the export of equipment to Iraq for its
SCUD missile program, allowing the Iraqis to increase the range of its
SCUD missiles. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
According to several accounts, Iraq uses US-supplied Bell
helicopters to deploy chemical weapons during its campaign to recapture
lost territories in its war with Iran. One of the towns that is within
the conflict zone is the Kurdish village of Halabja, with a population
of about 70,000. Between 3,200 and 5,000 Halabja civilians are
reportedly killed by poison gas (see August 25, 1988). Other accounts, however, suggest
that Iranian gas is responsible for the attack on Halabja, a version
that is promoted by the Reagan administration in order to divert the
blame away from Iraq. Some believe the US version of the Halabja
massacre is “cooked up in the Pentagon.” A declassified State Department
document “demonstrate[s] that US diplomats received instructions to
press this line with US allies, and to decline to discuss the details.” [US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 12/10/1990;LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/13/1991; WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
1/17/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 1/31/2003]
A
US delegation travels to Turkey at the request of the US Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and confirms that Iraq is “using chemical weapons on
its Kurdish population.” [US CONGRESS, 10/1988]
The United Nations sends a delegation of experts to the
Iraq-Iran War conflict zone to investigate Iraq’s use of chemical
weapons. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 76]However, Baghdad refuses to cooperate
and the US makes no serious attempt to press Baghdad to comply with the
UN Security Council’s decision. US Secretary of State George Shultz
downplays the charges against Iraq, arguing that interviews with Kurdish
refugees in Turkey and “other sources” do not conclusively support the
allegations being made against Saddam Hussein’s government. [NATION, 8/26/2002]
Kurds gassed in
Halabja. [Source:
PersianEye / Corbis]Days after the end of the Iran-Iraq
War (see August 20, 1988), Saddam Hussein begins the first of a
series of poison-gas attacks on Kurdish villages inside Iraq. A
September 1988 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states:
“Those who were very close to the bombs died instantly. Those who did
not die instantly found it difficult to breathe and began to vomit. The
gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of the villagers exposed to it. Many
suffered temporary blindness… . Those who could not run from the
growing smell, mostly the very old and the very young, died.” While the
gas attacks are continuing, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead
circulates a highly classified memo among senior State Department
officials recommending that the US cultivate even closer ties with Iraq,
whom it supported over Iran in the last few years of the war (see Early October-November, 1986). Whitehead offers a Cold War
rationale: “[Soviet] clout and influence is on a steady rise as the Gulf
Arabs gain self-confidence and Soviet diplomacy gains in
sophistication. The Soviets have strong cards to play: their border with
Iran and their arms-supply relationship with Iraq. They will continue
to be major players and we should engage them as fully as possible.”
Whitehead adds, “It should be remembered… that we have weathered
Irangate” (see January 17, 1986). More must be done to develop closer
ties with “the ruthless but pragmatic Saddam Hussein.” (Also seeSeptember 8, 1988.) [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
The US grants 65 licenses for
dual-use technology exports for Iraq. On average, the US is now granting
260 such licenses per year, more than double the rate of licenses
granted between January and August 1988. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 38]
Veteran diplomat Joseph Wilson
arrives in Baghdad to assume the post of Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)
under US Ambassador April Glaspie. Wilson has extensive experience
throughout sub-Saharan and Central Africa, as well as brief stints on
the staffs of Senator Al Gore (D-TN) and Representative Tom Foley
(D-WA). Wilson will later write that he and his colleagues share the
belief that Iraq is ruled by “a shockingly brutal regime… an ugly
totalitarian dictatorship” and its leader, Saddam Hussein, a
“sociopath.” For the next three years, Wilson and his colleagues will
send harsh reports of Hussein’s systematic violations of the human
rights of his subjects to Washington.Walking a Fine Line between Isolation
and Appeasement -
Still, most of the embassy staff, including Wilson and Glaspie, are not
advocates of totally isolating Hussein with extreme economic and
diplomatic sanctions. Wilson will write, “Isolating a regime often
results in isolating ourselves, and we then lose any leverage we
might have to influence outcomes. On the other hand, when dictators are
treated like any other leaders, it’s often interpreted by them as a free
pass to continue in their autocratic ways, while critics label it as
appeasement.… The merits of ideologically driven diplomacy versus a more
pragmatic approach have been a recurring theme of foreign policy
debates throughout the history of international relations and America’s
own domestic policies.”'Tread Lightly' - Wilson will note that “Iraq’s Arab neighbors unanimously
urged us to tread lightly. They argued that after almost a decade of a
grinding war with Iran, Saddam had learned his lesson and that his
natural radicalism would now be tempered by the harsh experience.… [I]t
was better to tie him to relationships that would be hard for him to
jettison than to leave him free to make trouble with no encumbrances.
Engaging with him at least kept him in our sights.” Iraq had behaved
monstrously during its war with Iran, and had offended the world with
its chemical attacks on its own citizens (see August 25, 1988) and its Iranian enemies (see October 1988). But it had emerged from the war as a
powerful regional player both militarily and economically. The Bush
administration is torn between trying to moderate Hussein’s behavior and
treating him as an incorrigible, irredeemable enemy of civilization.
And Washington wants Iraq as a balancing force against Iran, which is
awash in virulently anti-American sentiment (a sentiment returned in
full by many American lawmakers and government officials). No other
country in the Gulf region will tolerate the presence of US forces as a
counterbalance to Iran. So, as Wilson will write, “All of Iraq’s
neighbors continued to argue for a softer approach; and since they
clearly had at least as much at stake as we did, the Bush administration
was willing to follow their lead.”[WILSON, 2004, PP. 78-79, 451]
In a
memo regarding the issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Assistant
Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy writes, “The US-Iraqi relationship
is… important to our long term political and economic objectives. We
believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to
influence the Iraqis.”[WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
The US Senate unanimously passes the
Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, which makes Iraq ineligible to
receive US loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit
guarantees and items subject to export controls. It also makes it
illegal for the US to import Iraqi oil. [US CONGRESS, 9/8/1988; JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 78]Immediately after the bill is passed
by the Senate, the Reagan administration launches a campaign to prevents
its passage in the House. With the help of its allies in the House, the
administration succeeds in killing the bill on the last day of the
legislative session. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 78; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/13/2003]
The US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee confirms reports that between 1984 and 1988 “Iraq repeatedly
and effectively used poison gas on Iran.” [US CONGRESS, 10/1988]
Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) states that
in spite of the CIA and the Bush administration’s knowledge that Iraq’s
Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) was
“involved in Iraq’s clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons programs and missile programs… the Bush administration
[approved] dozens of export licenses that [allowed] United States and
foreign firms to ship sophisticated US dual-use equipment to
MIMI-controlled weapons factories.” [US CONGRESS, 8/10/1992]
The US learns that the Iraqi research
center, Saad 16, is involved in the development of chemical and nuclear
weapons. Three years earlier it had been discovered that the facility
was developing ballistic missiles (see November 1986). The Commerce Department will
continue to ship advanced technology products to the center. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a
Jordanian-born Palestinian, travels to Afghanistan in 1989 and fights
against the pro-Soviet government there. He becomes a radical Islamist
and reportedly trains at an al-Qaeda training camp there. He forms a
militant group later known as al-Tawhid. In 1993, he returns to Jordan
but is quickly arrested for possessing grenades and is sentenced to 15
years in prison. But he gathers many followers inside the prison and is
connected to growing Jordanian radical militant networks outside the
prison. In May 1999, Abdullah II becomes the new king of Jordan and
al-Zarqawi is released from prison as part of a general amnesty. [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 6/8/2006] In late 1999, al-Zarqawi is allegedly
involved in an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel
in Amman, Jordan (see November 30, 1999). [GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002; INDEPENDENT, 2/6/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 2/7/2003] By the end of 1999, he returns to
Afghanistan and meets bin Laden. However, bin Laden reportedly strongly
dislikes him, because al-Zarqawi comes across as too ambitious,
abrasive, and overbearing, and has differing ideological views. But
another al-Qaeda laeder, Saif al-Adel, sees potential and convinces bin
Laden to give a token $5,000 to set up his own training camp near the
town of Herat, close to the border with Iran. He begins setting up the
camp in early 2000 (see Early 2000-December 2001). [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 6/8/2006]
Iraq continues to meddle in the
affairs of Lebanon as a method of seeking revenge against Syria for
refusing to support Iraq in its war with Iran. Syria is in the process
of seizing control of Lebanon and imposing military force to quell the
fighting between the warring Lebanese factions, and Iraq has tried
numerous times to interfere with Syria’s activities in Lebanon. Iraq
earns the ire of the US when it tries to ship surface-to-surface
missiles into Beirut through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Such missiles
deployed in an urban environment such as Beirut would drastically
increase the level of violence throughout Lebanon. The US ambassador to
Iraq, April Glaspie, meets with Iraqi officials daily in the US’s
attempt to dissuade the Iraqis from arming Lebanese Prime Minister
Michel Aoun and his Maronite Christian faction, in Aoun’s losing
struggle against Syria. Glaspie points out that Aoun is a friend of
Israel, and by arming Aoun, Iraq is placing itself in a tacit alliance
with Israel. Joseph Wilson, Glaspie’s deputy, will later write, “For the
Iraqis, of course, it had nothing to do with Israel, or Aoun’s position
in Lebanon; it had everything to do with giving Syrian President Hafiz
al-Assad a bloody nose and using Beirut as the cudgel with which to bash
him. For the Iraqis, the road from Baghdad to Damascus went through
Beirut.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 88-89]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Bush administration, Michel Aoun, Joseph C. Wilson, Hafiz al-Assad
Secretary of State James Baker
receives a memo from the State Department informing him that Iraq is
aggressively developing chemical and biological weapons, as well as new
missiles. In spite of this disturbing intelligence, the memo also
instructs Baker to express the administration’s “interest in broadening
US-Iraqi ties” to Iraqi Undersecretary Kizam Hamdoon. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
3/24/1989]
Mohammed Said Nabulsi, Jordan’s
central bank governor, orders the country’s banks to deposit 30 percent
of their foreign exchange holdings with the central bank. The measure is
part of an effort to enforce regulations on liquidity ratios and reduce
the outflow of foreign exchange from Jordan. Petra, run by Ahmed
Chalabi, is the only bank among the 20 that is unable to comply with the
order. At the urging of Nabulsi, King Hussein puts Petra under
government supervision and orders an audit of the bank’s books. Petra’s
board of directors are replaced and an investigation begins. Two weeks
later, in August 1989, Chalabi flees the country—reportedly with $70
million. According to Hudson Institute’s Max Singer, Prince Hassan
personally drives Chalabi to the Jordanian border, helping him escape.
The investigation subsequently uncovers evidence of massive fraud. “The
scale of fraud at Petra Bank was enormous,” Nabulsi will later recall.
“It was like a tiny Enron.” Arthur Andersen determines that the bank’s
assets are overstated by $200 million. The bank is found to have
enormous bad debts (about $80 million); “unsupported foreign currency
balances at counter-party banks” (about $20 million); and money
purportedly owed to the bank which could not be found (about $60
million). Millions of dollars of depositors’ money had been routed to
the Chalabi family empire in Switzerland, Lebanon, and London, in the
form of loans that had not been repaid. The Chalabi family’s Swiss and
Lebanese firms, Mebco and Socofi, are later put into liquidation. As a
result of the fraud, the Jordanian government is forced to pay $200
million to depositors whose money had disappeared, and to avert a
potential collapse of the country’s entire banking system. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]Chalabi later provides a different
account of what happened. According to Zaab Sethna, a spokesman for the
Iraqi National Congress, King Hussein of Jordan turned on Chalabi in
coordination with Iraq because Chalabi was “using the bank to fund
[Iraqi] opposition groups and learning a lot about illegal arms
transfers to Saddam.” Petra Bank was also providing the CIA with
information on the Jordanian-Iraqi trade. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
President Bush signs National Security Directive (NSD) 26,
which asserts: “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key
friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. The
United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the
region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military
force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with
interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed
to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly
countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their
own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military
intervention.”Policy
on Iraq, Iran - NSD
26 is intended to promote the US’s outreach to Iraq as a counterweight
to the “inimical” Gulf nation of Iran. The directive states, “Normal
relations between the US and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests
and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United
States government should propose economic and political incentives for
Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.”
The directive also warns that Iraq would face “economic and political
sanctions” if it continued to pursue biological and chemical weapons,
and “[a]ny breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will
result in a similar response.”Human Rights - The directive advocates making
“[h]uman rights considerations” an “important element in our policy
towards Iraq,” and states that Iraq should be steered away from “its
meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to
play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and
cooperating in the Middle East peace process.” The directive takes a
much harder line on Iran, noting that before it can expect normalized
relations with the US, it must “cease its support for international
terrorism… help obtain the release of all American hostages… hal[t] its
subversive activities…,” seek peaceful co-existence with Iraq, and
“improv[e] its human rights practices.” [NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 26,
10/2/1989 ; WILSON, 2004, PP. 81-82]
; WILSON, 2004, PP. 81-82]James A. Baker.[Source: Library of Congress]By this date, all international banks
have cut off loans to Iraq. Notwithstanding, President Bush, ignoring
warnings from his own departments about the alarming buildup of the
Iraqi military and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass
destruction (see June 1989 and September 1989), signs the secret National Security
Directive 26 establishing closer ties to the Baghdad regime and
providing $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government.
These funds allow Iraq to continue its development of weapons of mass
destruction. Four days later, Secretary of State James Baker meets with
Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and promises that the US will not curb
restrictions on high-technology exports to Iraq. Baker is ignoring the
CIA’s warnings that Iraq is using some of this technology to develop a
nuclear weapon. The State Department’s minutes of the Baker-Aziz meeting
reads in part, “[T]he Secretary admitted that the US does have concerns
about proliferation, but they are worldwide concerns.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/2/1989; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/23/1992; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/10/2002]Clayton Yeutter.
[Source: Wally
McNamee / Corbis]Secretary of State James Baker calls Agriculture Secretary
Clayton Yeutter and demands that the Agriculture Department authorize a
billion dollars in new loans for Iraq, even though that department, and
others, want to limit or eliminate any funding to Iraq. Baker’s demand
is sparked in part by the refusal of international bankers to loan Iraq
any more money (seeOctober 2-6, 1989). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
CIA Director William Webster meets
with Kuwait’s head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd. Iraq will
claim after its invasion and occupation of Kuwait (seeAugust 2, 1990) that it had located a Kuwaiti
memorandum summarizing their conversation, a memo both the CIA and
Kuwaiti government officials will claim is a forgery, though both sides
will admit the meeting actually took place. Iraq will accuse the CIA and
Kuwait of collaborating to destabilize Iraq’s economy and government
(see Late August, 1990). The memo reads in part: “We agreed
with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the
deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on
that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central
Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure,
saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on
condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.” [NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
Kuwait’s
Director General of State Security sends a memo to the Minister of the
Interior summarizing a meeting with CIA Director William Webster. He
writes: “We agreed with the American side that it was important to take
advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to
put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common
border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate
means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated
between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high
level.” When Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), Iraqi officials find this memo and
confront the Kuwaiti foreign minister with it during an Arab summit
meeting in mid-August 1990. Upon seeing the memo, the Kuwaiti official
reportedly faints. [AHMED, 10/2/2001] The US claims the memo is a forgery.[OFFICE OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS,
1/21/2003 ]
]
In response to a US company’s concern
that their product might be used by Iraq to develop nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, the US Department of Commerce asks Iraq’s
government to provide a written guarantee that the company’s product
will be used for civilian purposes only. The Commerce Department tells
the company that a license and review is unnecessary, and that there is
no reason why the product in question should not be exported to Iraq.[JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 110]
Jordanian investigators spend 45 days
in the US looking for hidden assets belonging to a Washington, DC
subsidiary of Petra Bank, a Chalabi-controlled enterprise that collapsed
in 1989 (see August 2, 1989). Nearly all of the US assets listed
in Petra Bank’s books turn out to be worthless, with the notable
exception of an auxiliary office where valuable bank records are
presumably kept. The “office” is a country estate with a swimming pool
in upscale Middleburg, Virginia. It belongs to the Chalabi family, which
had been charging the bank a monthly rent. “There was not one business
record in the whole place,” an official will later recall. [NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
A study written by research analysts
at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute concludes:
“Baghdad should not be expected to deliberately provoke military
confrontations with anyone. Its interests are best served now and in the
immediate future by peace…. Revenues from oil sales could put it in the
front ranks of nations economically…. Force is only likely if the
Iraqis feel seriously threatened…. It is our belief that Iraq is
basically committed to a non-aggressive strategy and that it will, over
the course of the next few years, considerably reduce the size of its
military. Economic conditions practically mandate such action.” [PELLETIERE, JOHNSON, AND ROSENBERGER, 1990, PP. 41; GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, 10/18/2002]
Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed
Chalabi, already forging ties with the CIA and positioning himself to
take over from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (see May 1991and 1992-1996), is also strengthening his position
with the Iranian government. A CIA case officer later says that while he
cannot be sure exactly when Chalabi began reaching out to Iran, he “was
given safe houses and cars in [Kurdish-controlled] northern Iraq, and
was letting them be used by agents from the Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security [VEVAK], and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps.” [SALON, 5/5/2004; UNGER, 2007, PP. 125-126]
Speaking
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director William
Webster acknowledges the West’s increasing dependency on Middle East
oil. “I want to mention two key Middle East related issues that will
continue to have a major impact on US interests,” he tells senators.
“[One] Oil. Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil will rise
dramatically. By the year 2000, gulf states will supply an estimated 40
percent of Western oil, up from about 30 percent today. Meanwhile, US
dependence is expected to rise from about 10 percent to roughly 25
percent by the end of the decade. [Two] The Arab-Israeli peace process.
If the peace process does not advance over the next several years, the
Intifadah is likely to become more violent, terrorism will probably
rise, and Arab pressure on the United States to impose a settlement will
increase.” [US CONGRESS, 1/23/1990]
General
Norman Schwarzkopf says in a testimony before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services: “Middle East oil is the West’s lifeblood. It fuels us
today and being 77 percent of the Free World’s proven oil reserves, is
going to fuel us when the rest of the world has run dry…. Our allies are
even more dependent on Middle East oil. Japan gets almost two-thirds of
its oil from the area while our allies in Europe import over one
quarter.” [US CONGRESS, 2/8/1990]
April 1990: Hussein Threatens to ‘Burn Half of Israel;’ Bush Continues to Allow Iraq to Develop WMDs
Saddam Hussein, emboldened by
President Bush’s continued support for his regime even as he develops
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (seeSeptember 1989) and is gassing his own citizens (see
August 25, 1988), boasts that he now has chemical
weapons and will “burn half of Israel.” Additionally, Iraqi forces on
manuevers in the southern part of the country are being told that they
are training to attack Israel. Nevertheless, the White House blocks
efforts by the Commerce Department to stop the flow of US technology to
Iraq, even technology that is being used to develop weapons of mass
destruction (see 1990and July 18, 1990-August 1, 1990). One White House official explains,
“The president does not want to single out Iraq.” US diplomat Joseph
Wilson, the deputy chief of mission in Baghdad (see September 5, 1988 and After), will later write: “While we were
concerned about the tensions in Iraq’s relations with Kuwait (see May 28-30, 1990 and July 17, 1990), we did not suspect that the
southern military exercises were, in fact, a first signal of Iraq’s
intention to invade that country. We were more worried that
Saddam’s hard line toward Israel would further inflame Arab passions and
contribute to making any lasting settlement between Israel and the
Palestinians that much more difficult to achieve.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; WILSON, 2004, PP. 95]
Alan Simpson. [Source: Britt Bolen]A delegation of US senators meets
with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to deliver a message from President
Bush. The delegation is led by Robert Dole (R-KS) and includes Frank
Murkowski (R-AK), Jim McClure (R-ID), Alan Simpson (R-WY), and Howard
Metzenbaum (D-OH). The senators are joined by US Ambassador to Iraq
April Glaspie, her deputy Joseph Wilson, and various embassy staffers.
Dole delivers the message from Bush: Iraq must abandon its chemical and
biological weapons programs and stockpiles, and, in return, the US will
continue working to improve relations between the two countries (see July 27, 1990 and July 25, 1990). In response, Hussein says he is not
trying to destabilize the region and work against US interests. As part
of his statement, he says: “I didn’t really say I was going to set fire
to half of Israel (see April 1990). What I said was that if Israel
attacks me, thenI will set fire to half of Israel.”
Hussein insists he will only take action against Israel if his country
is attacked first, but such a response will be swift and overwhelming,
with his new WMD playing a central role. He also protests against what
he calls US and British efforts to contain Iraq by scaling back economic
and commercial programs, and what he calls a Western smear campaign
against him and his government. When the other senators are given a
chance to speak to Hussein, Wilson is struck by Metzenbaum’s response.
“Mr. President, I can tell you are a honorable man,” Metzenbaum says.
Wilson later writes, “I remember thinking to myself that whatever
beneficial impact the president’s message and Dole’s statement may have
had on Saddam, it had all just been negated by this obsequious
boot-licking.” Simpson joins Metzenbaum in stroking Hussein, bending
forward so low from his chair that he looks as if he is on bended knee
and telling the dictator: “Mr. President, I can see that what you have
here isn’t really a policy problem; what you have is a public relations
problem. You’ve got a problem with the haughty and pampered press. I
know all about that, because I’ve got problems with the press back home.
What you need is you need a good public relations person.” Wilson will
write: “Saddam no doubt took from the meeting not the admonition to stop
developing weapons of mass destruction and threatening his neighbors,
but rather support for his own misguided belief that he was an honorable
man who didn’t really have policy problems at all, just clumsy
relations. After all, one of Israel’s champions had told him so, and
another American leader had knelt before him to reassure him that he had
no problems with the American government.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 95]
The US Army presents a white paper to
President Bush in which it describes Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq as
the optimum contender “to replace the Warsaw Pact” and on that basis
argues for the continuation of Cold War-level military spending. [PILGER, 1994; CLARKE, 1994; ZEPEZAUER, 2003]
Just three months before Saddam
Hussein invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the Bush administration is still
sharing intelligence information with Iraq (seeAugust 1986). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
In repeated statements, Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein says that overproduction of oil by Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) is “economic warfare” against Iraq. [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996] Iraq is not merely issuing blustery
allegations with no basis in fact. Iraq is virtually bankrupt and deeply
in debt to both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which funded Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war, as well as other nations such as the US and Japan.
Hussein has spent billions rebuilding his military and distributing
massive amounts of consumer goods to the populace in an attempt to
persuade them that Iraq won the war against Iran and is now able to
spend its “war dividends.” In 1999, Kuwait defied the quotas laid down
by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
increased its oil production by 40%. The subsequent sharp drop in oil
prices drove Iraq’s economy towards catastrophe. The situation is
further aggravated by Iraqi suspicions that Kuwait is deliberately
“slant-drilling” oil from Iraq’s Rumaylah oil field (see July 15-17, 1990). Hussein needs a massive infusion of
revenue to maintain his large standing army and the fiction of economic
growth, and he looks to Kuwait as the source of that revenue. Land
issues also play a part: Iraq wants to swap some territory along the
border for control of two Kuwaiti-held islands across from its port at
Umm Qasr, but Kuwait is unwilling to make the trade. US diplomat Joseph
Wilson, the deputy chief of mission in Baghdad, describes the Iraqi
outlook on Kuwait as a nation “small, rich, and despised.” All in all,
the US diplomatic entourage in Baghdad is alarmed at Iraq’s preparations
for war. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 93-94; NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
A
500-page report completed on behalf of the Jordanian military
attorney-general charges that Ahmed Chalabi was directly responsible for
the collapse of Petra Bank (see August 2, 1989). It accuses him of making
“fictitious deposits and entries to make the income… appear larger;
losses on shares and investments; [and] bad debts… to Abhara company and
Al Rimal company.” The technical report contains 106 chapters, each of
which addresses a different irregularity. Most of them are attributed to
Chalabi. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003]
Iraq publicly accuses Kuwait of stealing oil by “slant
drilling” from Iraq’s Rumaylah oil field on the Iraq-Kuwait border (see May 28-30, 1990). Iraqi government officials warn
Kuwait that if the alleged theft of oil does not stop, Iraq will take
military action. [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996; NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
excoriates those Arab leaders whom he believes are collaborating with
the US and Israel to obstruct Arab development. He accuses several
unnamed Arab heads of state of being bought off with fancy houses and
vehicles, and failing to stand up to Western attempts to stymie Arab
ambitions. The real thrust of his criticisms is oil-based. He says that
overproduction of oil and the resultant low oil prices are “a poisoned
dagger” in Iraq’s back, delivered by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
(see May 28-30, 1990). Hussein intends to use his
influence with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
to drive the price of oil from $14 to $25 and thus raise a large amount
of cash to help pay off his country’s staggering debts to Japan, the US,
and several European countries. Hussein intends to stop Kuwait
overproduction, and he is willing to use military force to do it. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 97-98]
The US Commerce Department approves
$4.8 million in sales of advanced technology products to Iraq’s Ministry
of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) and Saad 16 research
centers. MIMI is known to be a development facility for chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs (see 1989) and Saad 16 is known to be involved
in the development of chemical and nuclear weapons (seeNovember 1986 and November 1986). [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Iraq begins massing troops near the
Iraq-Kuwait border in preparation for a possible attack (see August 2, 1990). [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996]
April Glaspie
and Saddam Hussein.[Source:
Wilson's Almanac]The US Ambassador to Iraq, April
Glaspie, goes to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to meet with Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz, to deliver a statement made earlier in the week by
State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler. The statement is
equivocal about Iraq’s belligerent pose towards Kuwait (see July 22, 1990), noting that although the US has no
mutual defense pact with Kuwait, “Iraq and others know there is no place
for coercion and intimidation in the civilized world.” Deputy Chief of
Mission Joseph Wilson will later describe Glaspie as having “a keen mind
and a profound understanding of the issues.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]One-on-One with Saddam Hussein - Shortly after her meeting with Aziz, she is summoned back to the Foreign Ministry and driven from there to a meeting with Saddam Hussein. Wilson will write: “This was unprecedented. During the two years she had been ambassador, Saddam had never held a private meeting with her, delegating all contact to Aziz or other underlings.” During the meeting, Glaspie promises Hussein that President Bush wants “better and deeper relations.” She tells Hussein that Bush is an “intelligent man,” and adds, “He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002;LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002; WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]
'No Opinion on Arab-Arab Conflicts' - Glaspie tells Hussein: “We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait.… We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your other threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not confrontation—regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?” Hussein answers that he intends to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Kuwait; Glaspie asks what solutions Hussein would find acceptable. Hussein wants to keep the entire Shatt al Arab [a strategically important waterway] under Iraqi control, and if given that, he is willing to make concessions to Kuwait. However, if he has to give up some control of the Shatt, he will renounce all control in favor of bringing Kuwait back under Iraqi dominion. Glaspie replies: “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary [of State James] Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” Reportedly Hussein takes this as a green light from the US to proceed with the invasion. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/1990; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/5/2003]
Glaspie Said to Be Scapegoated - Wilson will later write that the US policy failure that led to the invasion is not Glaspie’s fault and that she is merely made a scapegoat for it (see July 25, 1990 and After): “The one-on-one meeting with Saddam was fateful for Ambassador Glaspie. Out of it emerged the charge that she had not been tough enough with him and had somehow given him a green light to invade Kuwait. Nothing could be further from the truth.”Charge of US Manipulation - Author and investigative producer Barry Lando will say that the price of oil was manipulated with US connivance before the crisis in an effort to hurt Iraq (see Around July 25, 1990).
Entity Tags: Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Joseph C. Wilson, James A. Baker, Margaret Tutwiler
During a meeting with US Ambassador
to Iraq April Glaspie (see July 25, 1990), Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein
interrupts the meeting to take a phone call from Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak has worked tirelessly to mediate the burgeoning
dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. After the phone call, Hussein tells
Glaspie that he has just told Mubarak the same thing he told her—that he
will not invade Kuwait so long as there is an active negotiating
process taking place. The US later learns that Hussein asked Mubarak not
to share that piece of information with Kuwait in order to keep his
“bluff” alive. Mubarak apparently honors the request, because Iraq’s
subsequent invasion (see August 2, 1990) is a complete surprise to Kuwait.
Mubarak is reportedly infuriated at Hussein’s apparent betrayal of his
trust. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 98] In 2003, Glaspie’s then-deputy,
Joseph Wilson, will tell an interviewer that Hussein “lied to [Glaspie].
He lied to President Mubarak that he was going to allow the negotiating
process to go forward.” [PBS, 2/28/2003] In 2004, Wilson will write: “I
believe that he met with Glaspie for the express purpose of deceiving us
about his intentions, as he did with… Mubarak at the same time. In this
way, he maintained the element of surprise. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 123]
The deputy for US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie, Joseph
Wilson, later writes of the fateful meeting between Glaspie and Saddam
Hussein (see July 25, 1990). In his view, Glaspie will become a
scapegoat, receiving unfair blame for giving Hussein tacit permission to
invade Kuwait. Wilson later writes, “The one-on-one meeting with Saddam
was fateful for Ambassador Glaspie. Out of it emerged the charge that
she had not been tough enough with him and had somehow given him a green
light to invade Kuwait. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Glaspie has been made a convenient scapegoat for a more complicated and
complex failure of foreign policy.… Her explanation of American policy
towards Arab disputes did not waver from our standing instructions. The
United States did not take positions on the merits of such quarrels
between Arab nations, although the policy was to, in the strongest
terms, urge that the parties to a dispute resolve it diplomatically or
through international mediation, and not via military threats or
action.” During the meeting, Hussein made clear to Ambassador Glaspie
that Iraq had no intention of taking any military action against Kuwait
so long as there was an ongoing negotiating process. He tells Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak the same thing (see July 25, 1990). In later years, Iraqi officials
such as Aziz and then-Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Nizar Hamdun
will acknowledge that Glaspie did nothing more than reiterate the main
points of US policy towards Iraq to Hussein. Wilson, a friend of
Hamdun’s, will recall his last conversation with Hamdun before his death
in July 2003, where the ailing Hamdun confirmed that, in Wilson’s
words, “The Iraqi leadership had not come away thinking she had tacitly
indicated that the US condoned the use of force. On the contrary,
[Hussein] knew exactly what the American position was—opposition to
Iraqi military action, under any and all circumstances.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 99-101]
Barry Lando. [Source: Master Media Speakers]Author and investigative producer
Barry Lando later writes that the entire Iraq-Kuwait dispute may have
been manipulated to some extent by the UUS, with the meeting between US
Ambassador April Glaspie and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (see July 25, 1990) a centerpiece of the operation. In
February 2007, Lando will say, “After Iraq’s war with Iran ended, the
Kuwaitis manipulated the world oil price through their production—they
greatly increased their oil production, which dropped the world oil
price (seeMay 28-30, 1990 and Mid-1990). That really hurt Iraq, because
Saddam was counting on oil revenues to rebuild after the war. He went to
the Kuwaitis and he said, look, back off because you’re killing my
economy. The Kuwaitis refused to back down. Later it came out that the
Kuwaiti’s leaders had been meeting with the CIA exactly to put pressure
on Saddam Hussein. [Glaspie] told Saddam Hussein that we will not take
any position as far as your border disputes with Kuwait go. Her
superior, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, also testified before
Congress a couple of days later (see July 31, 1990). When asked point blank, ‘If Saddam
invades Kuwait, do we have any treaty with Kuwait?’ he said, ‘No, we
don’t.’” [BUZZFLASH (.COM), 2/23/2007]
No comments:
Post a Comment